Academic Studies Press Executes AABS Book Publication Subvention for Information Wars in the Baltic States, Ukrainian Open Access Translation

AABS is pleased to recognize Academic Studies Press for the successful execution of the AABS Book Publication Subvention for publishing the Ukrainian Open Access Translation of “Information Wars in the Baltic States: Russia’s Long Shadow,” edited by Janis Chakars and Indra Ekmanis, translated from the English by Iryna Yemenianova.

“We are extremely grateful to AABS for the opportunity to release this timely research in Ukrainian in open access,” said Mariia Shuvalova, Kyiv-based literary scholar and acquisition editor at Academic Studies Press. “This project not only creates working places in Ukraine, supporting intellectuals and professionals at risk, provides free access to knowledge for scholars, educators, students, while access to libraries is challenging, but also facilitates research and cultural projects, introducing authors to institutions and professionals in Ukraine (and Ukrainian centers all around the world) via collaborations and events.”

AABS is also pleased to publish, for the first time online, the English-language version of the preface to the Ukrainian edition of the book. Please find it below the bios of Chakars and Ekmanis.

About the Volume

This edited volume of contributions from leading scholars examines the information wars in the Baltic states, a battle that pits Russia against the West with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as sites of contention for great power politics. Chapters address responses from titular populations, local Russian speakers, national governments, activists, journalists, and NATO, as well as the impact of Russian foreign policy on media.

As Marco Werman (Journalist and Host of public radio program “The World”) notes, the volume also contributes to understanding the current Russian armed invasion into Ukraine: “The book also provides a valuable context for the current strife in Ukraine, with an approach that reminds us that while the stakes are as high as they’ve ever been with Russia and the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns, what is happening now is nothing new. It’s just far more sophisticated and complex. The experience of the Baltics shows us how sharply those campaigns have evolved, and how really no country on earth is immune.”

Now the Ukrainian version of the volume will be available in open access to Ukrainian educators, scholars, journalists, policymakers, and the broader public. Facing multiple challenges and threats, Ukrainian scholars continue to teach, research, document, and comprehend their experiences. The project was made by professionals and scholars based in Ukraine, who selected the work, translated, copyedited, proofreader, and created book cover.

The translation has been completed by Iryna Yemenianova, whose latest translations into Ukrainian were We are Bellingcat by Eliot Higgins and How ISIS Fights. Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt (with a special preface on Russia’s war against Ukraine) by Omar Ahour.

Contributors

Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, Viktor Denisenko, Joseph M. Ellis, Noel Foster, Clinton Glenn, Monika Hanley, Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, Andres Jõesaar, Jānis Juzefovicš, Sergei Kruk, Miika Sartonen, Ilva Skulte, Gunta Sloga, Asta Zelenkauskaite

Editor Bios:

Indra Ekmanis is a Baltic Sea fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the editor of FPRI’s Baltic Initiative. She was previously a research fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and a Fulbright researcher in Latvia. Ekmanis covered migration, European issues, and US domestic politics as a journalist for US public radio. Her academic work focuses on social integration, minority rights, nationalism, civil society, and democratic transition, with an area of specialization in the Baltic Sea region and post-Soviet space. She holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Washington.

Information Wars in the Baltic States – Preface to the Ukrainian-Language Edition

By Janis Chakars and Indra Ekmanis

Much of the work to put together this book happened during the Coronavirus pandemic via Google Docs, email, and texts, as well as phone and Zoom calls. However, before that, the editors—who live in different time zones in any case—did have one in-person meeting to discuss the book. It was at the Ukrainian League of Philadelphia in 2019.

A war was already on in Ukraine. Janis Chakars had just visited Kyiv. He was moved by the memorials on Independence Square and the exhibit about the current war in the Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War. The death toll had already topped 10,000, but life carried on in the capital. Parks were tranquil, cafes full, the American rock band Kiss played a concert on their farewell tour.

Chakars was in Ukraine following a visit to Latvia, where the war in Ukraine that started in 2014 had serious reverberations, not least of which in the communication environment where media increasingly became a security issue.

As this book first went to press, Russia had amassed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s border. Soon after, Russia began its full-scale invasion, attacking from three sides. This aggression impacted not only Ukraine, which at the time of this writing, continues to face mounting deaths and casualties, destruction of infrastructure, economic losses, and other suffering, but the region and world — not least of which the Baltic states, who have been among the strongest supporters of Ukraine.

Since the 2022 invasion, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have sent and pledged hundreds of thousands of euros in military equipment and other support to Ukraine. Their leaders have been among the most vocal in international forums, clear-eyed about the threat Russia poses and the need to secure Ukrainian victory. Collectively, the Baltic countries have hosted some 170,000 Ukrainian refugees — between 2.7 and 3% of their own populations (Hannen & Moyer, 2024). Rarely destination countries for newcomers, they swiftly moved to restructure systems to facilitate easier integration for Ukrainians fleeing the war, opening up avenues to employment, education, housing and language learning (though not without controversy, as many such supports were not extended to refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries). Many of these efforts—from raising funds for drones to driving across borders to pick up families seeking safety—came not only from governments, but from grassroots collective action. Some Russian-speakers in the Baltic states—particularly younger people—sought to draw a line between their ethno-linguistic identities and their political allegiances, increasingly assigning blame to Russia for the war and working to bring older generations access to new information sources freed from the grip of Moscow (Andžāns, 2024; Rassmusen, 2022). Today, even as some of the immediate groundswell of support has faded, the Baltic states feel a kinship with Ukraine. They are keenly aware that Ukrainians are fighting for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as much as for themselves.

A new media landscape

The introduction to this book ends with Russian journalists and dissidents taking refuge in the Baltic states following the illegal annexation of Crimea, as the Russian regime went about its work to stamp out free speech. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, that exodus continued. About 500 Russian journalists and their families came to Latvia. Latvians formed a group called Media Hub to help them with shelter, emotional support, legal services, and Latvian language lessons. Kirill Martynov of Novaya Gazeta Europe was one of these journalists. National Public Radio reported that “overall,” he believed “there’s been a warm welcome from Latvian authorities.” Martynov said it was “because they were under Soviet occupation, and they had thousands of people who lived in exile for decades. And so they understand quite clear what does it mean when, you know, when you have heavy dictatorship in your country and you’re forced to move abroad.” (Reeves, 2023)

Coupling stringent support for Ukraine and serving as a place of exile for Russian dissenters has not been without its complications for the Baltic countries. As this book explores, the information space is a murky battlefield, and determining the lines between free speech and national security further muddies the water. In Chapter 10, Sergei Kruk and Ilva Skulte write: “If Russian media on Latvian airwaves and internet portals is instrumentalized as the source of domestic problems without demonstrable causation, it may appear as more of a scapegoat than genuine threat. If in the process, democratic ideals are compromised, then democracy may be as well.” Though Kruk and Suklte write more broadly about access to Russian media in Latvia, the more recent experience of Russian broadcaster-in-exile TV Rain is a case-in-point.

On December 6, 2023, TV Rain (Dozhd, Дождь) lost its Latvian broadcasting license. TV Rain had been the last independent television broadcaster in Russia before it moved its headquarters to Riga. Soon after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it drew international attention for broadcasting Swan Lake in protest of Russia’s restrictions on war coverage—a reference to the January 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. The station had been declared a foreign agent in Russia a year earlier, but war restrictions made broadcasting impossible and the staff moved abroad, setting up studios in Latvia, the Netherlands, and Georgia. TV Rain is anti-war and covers Russian atrocities in Ukraine. It provides information and perspective that Russian channels in Russia cannot and do not. It does so with the ethos of compatriots.

Latvia’s decision to rescind TV Rain’s license followed a statement by correspondent Alexey Korostelev in which he said, “We hope we have been able to help many servicemen with their gear, for example, and basic necessities at the front because the accounts that have been published and that have been shared by their relatives are frankly horrifying.” Separately, the broadcaster ran up infractions of Latvian law that included failure to provide a Latvian-language audio track, referring to the Russian army as “our military,” and showing a map of Russia including Crimea. (Ukraine banned TV Rain in 2017 after it aired a map that similarly showed Crimea as part of Russia.) (Miller, 2017) Korostelev’s claim of aiding the Russian army set off alarm bells in the Latvian government and media regulator. TV Rain immediately fired Korostelev and issued an on-air apology that was called “flawless” by Russian-American journalist Masha Gesen, who was recently convicted by Russia in absentia for criticizing its army (Gessen, 2023). But the license was canceled anyway.

The decision was controversial within and without Latvia.

“There is Putin, who started the war. There is TV Rain, which tells the truth about Putin and about the war. Stripping TV Rain of its license only helps Putin,” said Kira Yarmysh, press secretary to jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, quoted in a BBC report (Armstrong, 2022). The Latvian Journalists Association called the punishment “disproportionate” to the crime (LSM, 2022). Reporters Without Borders called for Latvia to not revoke the license saying, “[TV Rain] can be criticized for the offenses with which it is accused but the withdrawal of its license would be a serious blow to journalistic freedom, independence and pluralism” (RSF, 2022). Meduza, the Russian opposition news outlet that has operated in Latvia since 2014, wrote on its website:  “We believe that the decision by Latvia’s National Electronic Media Council to revoke TV Rain’s license is unfair, wrong, and disproportionate to the official violations flagged by the agency.” They added, “Even if it was reached completely legally, the National Electronic Media Council’s decision is also an incredible gift to the Russian authorities” (Editorial Board, 2022).

Indeed, Russia quickly used the episode to claim Latvia was no better a home for TV Rain than Russia. As quoted in a Reuters article, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov argued that Latvia’s move showed foreign states were no freer than Russia. “Some always think that elsewhere is better than home. And some always think that freedom is elsewhere and there is no freedom at home. This is one of the clearest examples that demonstrate the fallacy of such illusions,” he said (Sytas, 2022). Despite its apology, TV Rain’s editor-in-chief Tikhon Dzyadko said in a recent interview, “this decision did not do any good” and questioned whether Latvians were a civilized people. He threatened to take a court case against Latvia to the European Court of Human Rights if an appeal fails (Gerdžiūnas, 2024a). Media Hub is helping with that appeal. “They needed time to learn about our sensitivities, our triggers,” said Sabīne Sīle, head of Media Hub Riga in an Interview with Lithuanian Radio and Television. “The expectation for them was that they would be perfect, not make mistakes” (Gerdžiūnas, 2024b).

When the license was the revoked, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs (now Latvia’s president) said the country was right to give shelter and a license to TV Rain, but that the broadcaster was obliged to comply with Latvian laws while in Latvia (Krenberga, 2022). Ivars Āboliņš, chairman of the Latvian National Electronic Mass Media Council responded that TV Rain did not understand “the essence and gravity” of its violations (Sytas, 2022).

What was the essence and gravity of the offense? Researcher Una Bergmane (2022) notes that if the Latvian state regulator’s board had a different make up of political parties there might have been a different result, but the result clearly relates to concern for sovereignty and media policy as a security issue in Latvia. “[O]ne also cannot overlook the imperial legacies that have shaped the clash: Those who have been marginalized and dominated by empires are often hypervigilant to all manifestations of imperial practices; meanwhile, those who come from imperial centers are often unwilling and unable to see imperialistic patterns in their own attitudes.”  

The essence and gravity of the offense were what she called “lingering imperialism,” but the term now widely under use and debate in the field of Slavic, East European and Eurasian studies since the start of Russia’s full scale invasion is “decolonization” (ASEEES, 2023). Scholars of Baltic studies have joined the conversation as well with panel presentations at recent area studies conferences (Esse, et al., 2024; Esse et al., 2023). Indeed, in the early days following the full-scale invasion, the Baltic states moved quickly to erase remaining relics of Soviet occupation and lingering Russification, from dismantling old monuments and moving away from Russian language in schools to banning St. George’s ribbon and Russia’s military “Z” as symbols of military aggression. Efforts at such decolonization extended not only to banning Russian propaganda television from Moscow and cracking down on exiled Russian media as in the case of TV Rain, but more broadly to even local Russian-language sources of information.   

In Chapter 6 of this volume, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece writes prescient words: “Russian-language television has always been a contested issue for policy makers in Latvia … The competing pressures of minority integration, free expression, as well as Latvian self-determination and cultural survival in an age of globalization, increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, and heightened geopolitical tensions ensure that it will continue to be so in the future as well.”

In fall of 2023, Latvia’s parliament approved a National Security Concept calling for an end to Russian-language public media as a further step in the process of decolonization, noting that public media should only finance content in Latvian and languages belonging to the European cultural space, though commercial media in Russian could continue (Republic of Latvia). (TV originating from Russia had already been banned, though it remains unofficially accessible) (Skirmante, 2023). International news organizations criticized Latvia for the move to  stop Russian-language public media. The European Broadcasting Union, International Federation of Journalists, Justice for Journalists Federation, Southeast Europe Media Organization, Reporters without Borders, and the committee to Protect Journalists signed a letter that read in part:

We are concerned that this new proposal will mean Russian speakers in Latvia will no longer have regular access to credible and fact-checked information, leaving them exposed to disinformation, fake news, and propaganda. The ability of public service media to provide vital information and connect with all of society is especially critical in light of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine (EBU 2023).

Reaching Russian-speaking audiences effectively has been a contested, but critical part of the efforts to combat disinformation in the Baltic states and reduce the effects of siloed information spaces. The security concept justifies its recommendation to end Russian-language programming as a step toward facilitating belonging in a unified information space for all of Latvia’s residents (Republic of Latvia, 2023). However, in Chapter 5, Andres Joesaar underscores the importance of engaging the Russian-speaking community with public media offerings. He cites the growth of ETV+, a Russian-language television channel operated by Estonian Public Broadcasting: “We can conclude that the launch of ETV+ has had a positive impact, broadening the ‘footprint’ of public service broadcasting and, in doing so, hopefully bringing two language communities into a common unified information field.”

In Latvia, such measures are now unlikely. The process of decolonization there, as seen in the choice to end Russian-language public media, currently precludes such a move. Still, moves in either direction follow the pattern identified by Chakars and Ekmanis, who write, “Media in the Baltic states, whether broadcasting or broadsheets, have long been seen as tools and measures of power. Consequently, the litmus papers of autonomy and sovereignty for Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians have shown their colors in mass media and who controls it.” However, as Jānis Juzefovičs notes in this volume, the perceived instrumentalization or weaponization of media in the information wars has made both Latvian and Russian-speaking audiences look at news media with “skepticism and even cynicism.” Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and increased restrictions on Russian media, the mistrust of media among Latvia’s Russian-speaking population has only grown. (Juzefovičs, 2024)

Conclusion

Outside of Ukraine, the war’s battlefield is often in airwaves and headlines. Sustained attention is critical for maintaining moral, financial, and physical support for Kyiv. It is also a space that used to confuse and obfuscate realities of the war. This is the context into which this book was initially published. It is still true now. But it is not a new phenomenon. Media and information have always been contested. It is our hope that these case studies of the experiences of the Baltic states shed further light on the information wars that have shaped the region.

Sources

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